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Abstract.  Two recent studies have shown that “cheap talk” is an effective means of eliminating 
positive hypothetical bias in experimental and field-auction settings.  We further investigate the 
ability of cheap talk to mitigate positive hypothetical bias in a CVM phone survey administered 
to over 4,000 households.  Positive hypothetical bias is detected in our data by contrasting 
revealed and stated preference information.  However, a short, neutral cheap-talk script appears  
to exacerbate rather than mitigate the bias.  Based on this and mixed evidence from earlier 
studies, we suggest caution in using cheap talk as an ex ante control for hypothetical bias.   
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1. Introduction 
The contingent valuation method (CVM) is a widely used approach for estimating the value 
of goods and services when market information on equilibrium prices and quantities is either 
unavailable or unreliable.  CVM has been employed by courts and government agencies such as 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric 
Administration, and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to assess the benefits of policies 
impacting the environment and damages from environmental disasters.  Researchers often 
estimate these values through surveys that ask individuals to place a monetary value on the 
hypothetical provision of a good or service.  Since provision of the good and the associated 
payment are purely hypothetical, the reliability and validity of information obtained from CVM 
has been the subject of lively debate (Diamond and Hausman, 1994; Hanneman, 1994).  
Proponents of CVM have attempted to develop new methodologies that either (1) mitigate ex 
ante any hypothetical bias (i.e., bias associated with the respondent misstating her willingness to 
pay (WTP) due to the hypothetical nature of the good and payment method), or (2) calibrate the 
welfare estimates ex post (List and Shogren, 1998).                
Recently, Cummings and Taylor (1999) and List (2001) have advocated the use of “cheap 
talk” to mitigate the effects of hypothetical bias in CVM.  In the context of CVM, cheap talk 
refers to explicit warnings about the problem of hypothetical bias provided prior to respondents’ 
valuation of the good.  Cummings and Taylor (CT hereafter), in a series of lab experiments with 
students, find that cheap talk successfully eliminates hypothetical bias in valuation responses for 
a variety of public goods.  List (2001) tests a similar script for private goods using sportscard 
auctions and finds that cheap talk is effective in eliminating hypothetical bias for non-dealers, 
but not for dealers.  The cheap-talk scripts used in both of these studies are almost identical in   4
length and content.  They each provide lengthy descriptions of positive hypothetical bias (i.e., 
upward bias in the valuation responses of those facing hypothetical rather than actual payment). 
In order for cheap talk (such as that applied by CT and List) to be a useful design element in 
CVM surveys, the script needs to be general so that, unlike ex post calibration, it can be easily 
applied across a wide array of non-market goods without requiring ex ante information on the 
degree of hypothetical bias.  Unfortunately, the scripts used in CT and List (2001) are not easily 
generalized.
1  Both scripts refer to a baseline degree of hypothetical bias by comparing the 
outcomes of preliminary experiments with hypothetical and real payment mechanisms for the 
goods in question.  In CVM research, such prior information regarding the degree of hypothetical 
bias is typically unavailable or too expensive to produce in the field.  
Our research addresses this concern by testing a version of cheap talk that can easily be 
generalized to other goods or services.  We administered a telephone survey to over 4,000 
households regarding their WTP for a curbside recycling service.  Unlike the pure public goods 
used in the CT experiments and the private good in List’s field auctions, curbside recycling can 
be considered an impure public good because it provides both potential private benefits (in the 
forms of added convenience relative to dropoff recycling, reduced garbage fees, and a “warm 
glow” from helping the environment), and public benefits by reducing the stream of waste going 
to landfills (Andreoni, 1990).  As part of our survey design, we randomly assign our sample into 
three groups – the first receiving no cheap talk, the second receiving a short-script version of 
cheap talk, and the third receiving cheap talk with a reminder of budget constraints and 
substitutes.  Aside from using a shorter script (to be compatible with phone surveys), the primary 
                                                 
1In addition to their main script, CT report similar results using a modified script that replaces the specific 
percentages of people in previous studies who voted “yes” for hypothetical and real referenda, with a statement 
indicating that “on average” more people voted “yes” for hypothetical referenda (see CT, pages 659-660).  Although 
the modified script is more general in the sense of not reporting the magnitude of hypothetical bias, it still informs 
the subjects that the bias is positive.   5
difference between our cheap-talk scripts and those used by CT and List is the manner in which 
hypothetical bias is described to the survey respondents.  While CT and List state that 
hypothetical bias leads people to overstate their true WTP, the cheap-talk scripts in our survey 
are purposefully neutral.  Instead, they inform respondents that hypothetical bias leads people to 
misstate their true WTP. 
We crafted neutral cheap-talk statements for two reasons.   First, we wished to avoid 
criticisms that we are simply layering on another type of bias, one that is independent of the 
observed hypothetical bias itself.
2  Second, researchers typically do not know ex ante whether 
hypothetical bias will exist or if it will be positive or negative (Dickie et al., 1987; Adamowicz, 
et al., 1994; Carson et al., 1996; Nestor, 1998; Haab et al., 1999).  Unlike CT and List, we had no 
prior evidence regarding the direction and magnitude of hypothetical bias for our population.  
Therefore, we decided to err on the side of caution so as not to induce any additional bias.  Much 
to our surprise, this seemingly innocuous change in verbiage from a directed to a neutral script 
caused respondents receiving cheap talk to state higher WTP than those not receiving cheap talk.  
This counterintuitive result is robust across models, types of households, and types of recycling 
programs.  As a result, we are led to question the efficacy of cheap-talk statements in mitigating 
hypothetical bias in CVM surveys. 
The next section provides examples of the cheap-talk designs used in the previous studies.  In 
Section 3, we briefly describe the survey and cheap-talk scripts used in our study.  Section 4 
reports our empirical evidence on hypothetical bias and cheap talk.  Section 5 summarizes our 
overall findings.          
 
                                                 
2 This hypothesis of a “layering effect” is refuted by CT for one of their sub-groups.  However, we feel that it is still 
an open question, particularly for CVM surveys.   6
2. Previous Use of Cheap Talk 
CT are the first to use the game-theoretic terminology “cheap talk” in the context of CVM.  
Cheap talk differs from standard reminder statements about substitutes and budget constraints in 
that the script explicitly warns respondents about the potential problem of hypothetical bias.  
Loomis et al. (1994) and Neil (1995) find that short-scripted reminder statements (without cheap 
talk) are ineffective in altering respondents’ stated WTP for a public good in a hypothetical 
setting.  However, CT find that a cheap-talk script openly discussing the existence of positive 
hypothetical bias prior to voting on public good referenda eliminates the bias in an experimental 
setting, in the sense that the results from the cheap-talk and actual referenda are statistically 
indistinguishable.
3  An excerpt from CT’s cheap-talk script is given below 
 
  ... in a recent study, several different groups of people voted on a referendum just 
like the one you are about to vote on.  Payment was hypothetical for these groups, as it 
will be for you.  No one had to pay money if the referendum passed.  The results of 
these studies were that on average 38 percent of them voted “yes”.  With another set of 
groups with similar people voting on the same referendum as you will vote on here, but 
where payment was real and people really did have to pay money if the referendum 
passed, the results on average across the groups were that 25 percent voted yes.  That’s 
quite a difference, isn’t it? 
  We call this a “hypothetical bias.”  Hypothetical bias is the difference that we 
continually see in the way people respond to hypothetical referenda as compared to 
real referenda…  
  
List reads a nearly identical cheap-talk script to market participants in a field auction for 
sportscards.  Similar to CT, he finds that cheap-talk statements are effective in eliminating 
hypothetical bias, but only for ordinary consumers (non-dealers).  Dealers, who presumably have 
more market experience in valuing sportscards, are not influenced by cheap talk.   
                                                 
3 Two other studies – Loomis et al. (1996) using a short script somewhere between a reminder statement and cheap 
talk and Murphy et al. (2003) using CT’s cheap talk script – find that while these statements do not eliminate 
hypothetical bias, they do reduce it.   7
Poe et al. (2002) find that the following short script: 
 
I have one caution though.  For programs like this it’s often the case that more 
people say they would sign up than actually do sign-up.  Utilities in other parts of the 
country have found that eight times as many people say yes to similar programs as 
actually take part in them.  With this in mind… 
 
does not have a statistically significant effect on the participation decisions of individuals 
valuing green power and tree planting in New York via a provision-point mechanism CVM 
survey.  Aadland and Caplan (2003) also employ a shorter version of cheap talk than CT and 
List.  Similar to List, they find that the effectiveness of cheap talk varies by type of household.  
In particular, those households who might be expected to suffer the most from positive 
hypothetical bias (e.g. those motivated to recycle by an ethical duty or who are members of an 
environmental organization) also tend to lower their stated WTP the most in response to cheap 
talk.  Their cheap-talk script reads 
 
...  studies have shown that many people say they are willing to pay more for 
curbside recycling than they actually will pay when it becomes available in their 
community.  For this reason, as I read the next two curbside recycling fees, please 
imagine your household actually paying them.       
 
To our knowledge, this is the first evidence that short-script cheap-talk statements can be 
effective in mitigating positive hypothetical bias in CVM surveys.
4 
 
                                                 
4 In a related working paper, Cummings et al. (1995) find that while “heavy” cheap talk tends to offset positive 
hypothetical bias, “light” cheap talk actually tends to increase the upward bias in a public good valuation 
experiment.  We note, however, that their light version is still a much longer script than those used by Poe et al. 
(2002) and Aadland and Caplan (2003).   8
3. Cheap-Talk and Survey Design 
During the winter of 2002, we conducted a telephone survey about recycling behavior to over 
4,000 households in 40 western U.S. cities with populations over 50,000.
5  Our primary goal was 
to estimate household WTP for curbside recycling, controlling for a host of household-, 
program-, and community-specific characteristics.  We described the following hypothetical 
curbside recycling program (CRP) to households who either did not have a CRP in their 
community or were unaware of its existence: 
 
      At the beginning of the survey, you said that your community does not currently 
have a curbside recycling service.  For the next few questions, please imagine that you 
COULD have a service that regularly collects aluminum cans, cardboard, glass, paper, 
plastic and tin cans.  Your household (would/would not) need to sort your recyclables 
into separate bins and pay a fee for the recycling service, in addition to your current 
monthly garbage collection fee.  Now we are going to ask you some questions about 
your household's willingness to pay for this type of curbside recycling service. 
 
After describing the CRP, we then randomly assigned respondents with equal probability to 
one of three groups.  The first group received no cheap-talk statement and proceeded directly to 
the valuation questions.  The second group received the following short-scripted cheap talk 
statement, which was read prior to the ensuing double-bounded dichotomous-choice (DBDC) 
WTP questions:  
 
    As you prepare to answer the next few questions, please keep in mind that in 
previous surveys we have found that the amounts that people SAY they are willing to 
pay for curbside recycling are sometimes different from the amounts that they would 
ACTUALLY be willing to pay when curbside recycling became available in their 
community. For this reason, as I read the following curbside recycling fees, please 
imagine your household is ACTUALLY paying them. 
 
                                                 
5 The survey was administered by the survey research laboratory at Washington State University.  A list of the 40 
cities in our sample is available from the authors by request.   9
This cheap-talk script is substantially shorter than that used by CT and List (2001) – so as to be 
compatible with a phone survey – and intentionally does not take a stand regarding the direction 
of hypothetical bias.  The third group of households received the following “long” cheap-talk 
script, which added explicit reminders to the household about budget constraints and alternatives 
to recycling: 
 
As you prepare to answer the next few questions, please keep in mind the following 
three things.  First, keep in mind your household budget.  In a typical month, at what 
price would your household be able to afford curbside recycling?  Second, keep in mind 
that there are alternatives to curbside recycling such as recycling drop-off centers and 
landfills.  And third, keep in mind that in previous surveys we have found that the 
amounts that people SAY they are willing to pay for curbside recycling are sometimes 
different from the amounts that they would ACTUALLY be willing to pay when curbside 
recycling became available in their community. For this reason, as I read the following 
curbside recycling fees, please imagine your household is ACTUALLY paying them. 
 
Our decision to test variations in script length and reminders about budget constraints and 
substitutes is motivated by mixed results in the literature.  As mentioned above, CT find that 
long-scripted cheap talk is effective in an experimental setting.  List (2001) finds that similar 
long-scripted cheap talk is effective in field auctions for dealers but ineffective for non-dealers.  
Similar to List, Aadland and Caplan (2003) find a short-scripted version of cheap talk is effective 
only for certain types of households.  Poe et al. (2002) report that short-scripted cheap talk is 
ineffective in eliminating hypothetical bias.  Loomis et al. (1994) and Neil (1995) find that 
reminders about budget constraints and substitutes are also ineffective.  In sum, the evidence 
regarding the effectiveness of various cheap-talk and reminder statements is anything but clear.  
Our survey was designed to help sort out the patterns between cheap talk, reminder statements, 
and hypothetical bias.    
   10
4. Empirical Results 
  In this section, we report three sets of empirical results.  The first set documents the existence 
of positive hypothetical bias in our data.  That is, we find that households who are making a 
hypothetical decision to participate in a CRP are, all else equal, more likely to participate than 
households who have made an actual decision of whether to participate in a real CRP.  Next, we 
document the unconditional and conditional effects of cheap-talk scripts on households’ 
responses.  For our unconditional evidence, we contrast stated participation rates for the CRP 
referendum with and without cheap talk.  The advantage of examining the unconditional 
participation rates is that they are transparent and are not dependent on any particular 
econometric model.  For our conditional evidence, we report the coefficient estimates associated 
with cheap-talk dummy variables from an econometric model where we control for a host of 
potential differences across treatments and groups.  
 
4.1 Estimates of Hypothetical Bias 
  We begin by documenting the existence of positive hypothetical bias in our CVM responses.  
Toward this end, we compare the participation decisions of households who are voting on a 
hypothetical CRP referendum with the actual participation decisions of households in 
communities with existing voluntary CRPs.
6  Our survey was designed to facilitate such a 
comparison by choosing appropriate bid values and describing hypothetical CRPs that are similar 
to existing voluntary programs in our sample.
7  
  Our discussion of the econometric model used to document the existence of positive 
hypothetical bias is purposefully brief, as it closely follows the procedure outlined in Cameron 
                                                 
6 By “voluntary” we mean that the household pays for the program only if it has signed up for it. 
7 Since households in our sample are spread across 40 western U.S. cities, we adjust CRP fees and income levels for 
differences in costs of living using the city comparison calculator at http://list.realestate.yahoo.com/re/neighbor/.   11
(1988).  WTP questions are set in the DBDC format to elicit a household’s WTP through a 
sequence of yes-or-no valuation questions.  The first question is:  “Would you be willing to pay 
$τ for the service?”  The opening bid τ is chosen randomly from the integers $2 through $10 in 
order to mitigate the effects of starting point bias.  Based on her response to the opening bid, the 
respondent is then asked a similar follow-up question, but with a larger bid, τH = 2τ, if she 
answered “yes” (i.e., willing to pay at least τ for the service) or a smaller bid τL = 0.5τ if she 
answered “no” (i.e., unwilling to pay τ for the service).  Those who answer “no” to the first two 
questions are then asked whether they would participate in a program that is free of charge.  
Based on the responses to the opening bid and follow-up questions, the respondent’s latent WTP 
may be placed in one of five regions:  (-∞,0), (0,τL), (τL,τ), (τ,τH) or (τH, ∞).   
  We then posit that the household’s true WTP (WTP*) is represented by the equation    
  ii i WTP* X =β + ε ,                                           (1) 
where Xi is a row vector of household-, program-, and community-specific control variables, β is 
a corresponding column vector of coefficients, and εi is a normally distributed error term for 
households i = 1,…,n.  We also allow for possible heteroscedasticity by modeling the variance of 
the WTP error term as  
 
2
ii i (Z ) exp(Z ) σγ = γ ,                        (2) 
where Zi is a row vector of variables related to the disturbance variances and γ is a column vector 
of parameters.   
  To detect hypothetical bias we pool respondents who have made actual participation 
decisions in communities with voluntary CRPs with respondents who have valued similar   12
hypothetical CRPs at similar bid values.
8  We then estimate a simple (random-threshold) probit 
model for the decision of whether to participate in a CRP, while controlling for a host of 
demographic, program, and community attributes such as age, education, income, employment 
status, motivation for recycling, degree of sorting required for CRP, availability and use of 
substitutes to recycling, etc.
9  Our null hypothesis of no hypothetical bias is tested by observing 
the statistical significance of the coefficient on the dummy variable for whether the participation 
decision is hypothetical (i.e., based on the household’s valuation of the hypothetical program) or 
real (i.e., based on the household’s actual decision of whether to participate in its community’s 
existing CRP).  If we find that there is no statistical difference between the participation rates of 
households in communities with voluntary CRPs and those hypothetically valuing a CRP then, 
all else equal, we conclude that hypothetical bias is unlikely to be a problem in our population.  
If instead, the coefficient on the hypothetical dummy variable is positive and statistically 
significant, we conclude that positive hypothetical bias is likely to exist, and its average level is 
measured by the value of the coefficient.  The estimation results are shown in Table 1.   
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
  The signs and significance levels of the demographic, program- and community-specific 
variables are similar to the results in Aadland and Caplan (2003).  We therefore focus on the 
result germane to this section – the sign and magnitude of the estimated coefficient on the 
dummy variable for whether the participation decision was hypothetical (HYPOTHETICAL).  
                                                 
8 More precisely, our pooled dataset is created by first including all households that know a voluntary CRP exists in 
their community (and therefore have revealed their preferences via the decision of whether to participate).  These 
CRPs vary in terms of their monthly cost-of-living-adjusted fees (which are roughly between $1 and $5 per month), 
and whether they require sorting of the recyclables.  Second, we include all households that valued hypothetical 
sorting and non-sorting CRPs with opening bids that were within the $1 to $5 interval for existing voluntary CRPs.  
Although our WTP questions are set in the DBDC format, we consider only opening bids so that the design of the 
hypothetical decision mimics the actual decision as closely as possible.  The pooled dataset contains 1,782 
households – 994 revealed preference and 788 stated preference.     
9 Detailed definitions of all the variables used in this analysis are included in the Appendix.   13
The coefficient is statistically significant and indicates that, all else equal, respondents valuing a 
hypothetical CRP stated a maximum WTP that is, on average, $3.39 more than those valuing an 
existing voluntary CRP.  Stated in terms of likelihood of participation, the respondents for the 
hypothetical CRP are 17.7 percent more likely to participate than those valuing an existing CRP.  
This suggests that positive hypothetical bias is present in our data.  Additional evidence of 
positive hypothetical bias can also be inferred from the unconditional participation rates 
presented in Table 2 of the next section, to which we now turn.   
 
4.2 Unconditional Cheap-Talk Effects 
  Does cheap talk mitigate the positive hypothetical bias in our data?  In Table 2 we report 
average rates of participation across bid levels, cheap-talk scripts, and types of CRP (actual or 
hypothetical).   It is important to note that unlike the analysis in the previous section, we are not 
interested in the actual participation decisions of households residing in communities with 
voluntary CRPs.  Instead, we focus on how cheap talk influences the stated maximum WTP of 
households that are either placing a value on the existing CRP in their community or the 
hypothetical CRP. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
  Before discussing the effects of cheap talk, notice that, as expected, participation rates 
generally decline as the bid levels increase.  Also, notice that for the cases where no cheap talk is 
given (i.e., No C-Talk columns), the participation rates are higher (51.0 versus 40.3 percent) 
when respondents are valuing a hypothetical, as opposed to an actual, CRP.  Although this is not 
a pure test of hypothetical bias as in Section 4.1, it lends further credibility to the existence of 
positive hypothetical bias in our data.   14
  Based on the unconditional participation rates in Table 2, there is strong evidence that our 
neutral cheap-talk statements are associated with higher rates of participation and WTP for 
curbside recycling.  The positive effect of cheap talk appears to be strongest for households who 
are valuing an existing CRP in their community (as opposed to the hypothetical CRP described 
in our survey), and who received the longer script with cheap talk and a reminder about 
substitutes and budget constraints (52.7 versus 40.3 percent).  For the case of households valuing 
the hypothetical CRP, there is no statistical difference between the participation rates of those 
who received the short cheap-talk script and those who did not receive any cheap talk.  
Nevertheless, considering the large overall sample size (N = 4268), it is clear that there is 
absolutely no evidence that cheap talk (either with or without a reminder about substitutes and 
budget constraints) is effective in mitigating the positive hypothetical bias in our data.  To the 
contrary, cheap talk appears to exacerbate the bias!       
  We now offer a few potential explanations for this counterintuitive result.  To begin, it could 
be argued that by including the word “landfills” in our long-script version we unwittingly created 
an environmental “flashpoint”, triggering images of overflowing garbage dumps in the minds of 
respondents who then reacted by inflating their WTP responses.  The problem with this 
hypothesis, however, is that it cannot completely explain our results, as those valuing an actual 
CRP and receiving short-scripted cheap talk (without the landfill reference) also tend to be more 
likely to participate (49.5 versus 40.3 percent – see Table 2 – and, as we will see in Section 4.3, 
to state conditionally higher values than those not receiving any cheap talk. 
  A second possible explanation, provided by Cummings et al. (1995), is that cheap talk 
“might assure those doubting the hypothetical nature of the experiment that it is indeed 
hypothetical” and as a result encourages positive hypothetical bias.  The difficulty with this   15
explanation is in understanding why additional positive bias is elicited from some scripts but not 
others.  A third possibility is that when they hear a neutral cheap-talk script stating only that 
“people tend to misstate their true WTP,” as opposed to the standard script stating that “people 
tend to overstate their true WTP,” survey respondents may be induced to rely more heavily on 
their own heuristics and inferences in an attempt to guess what type of bias the researchers have 
in mind.  If this hypothesis is true, our results indicate that respondents may be guessing that we 
would expect them to correct this bias by stating higher WTP values.
10   
  Each of these hypotheses and our empirical results suggest that we simply do not understand 
how the human cognitive process receives and then reacts to signals such as cheap talk.  Several 
theories of how human cognition reacts to signals are discussed in Fischhoff (2002).  As 
Fischhoff points out, artifacts (such as unexpected responses to cheap talk) could emanate from 
“the subtle ways that interviewers communicate their expectations.”  He also notes that 
“...elicitation is a reactive measurement procedure...The process assumes that people sometimes 
need help, in order to understand what they believe and want.  That help may include presenting 
a balanced selection of opinions, lest clients miss a critical perspective just because it did not 
occur to them at the time.”  It is possible that in erring on the side of conciseness, our short but 
balanced cheap-talk script provided insufficient detail regarding “selection of opinions,” 
resulting in unpredictable effects on WTP. 
  As a final note, we acknowledge that our counterintuitive cheap-talk results could simply be 
due to systematic differences in the treatment and control groups.  This seems unlikely, however, 
as the cheap-talk scripts were assigned randomly across such a large number of households and 
                                                 
10 Alternatively, respondents may be reacting to what they believe the university-sponsored interviewer wants to 
hear, thus creating a “social desirability bias” in favor of curbside recycling.  We thank John Loomis for this insight.   16
communities.  Nevertheless, for the sake of thoroughness, we now turn to a conditional analysis 
of cheap talk’s effects.       
 
4.3 Conditional Cheap-Talk Effects   
  Our conditional estimates are based on the DBDC model first introduced by Carson et al. 
(1986) and applied in Aadland and Caplan (2003).  We use maximum likelihood to estimate the 
full model that incorporates the responses to both the initial and follow-up bids.  As in the 
participation probit model in Section 4.1, we control for a number of demographic and 
community attributes.
11  Based on our earlier work and List (2001), we also estimate models that 
allow for differential cheap-talk effects across household characteristics.  
  The results from this exercise are reported in Table 3.  The first row of the Table 3 shows the 
effect of short and long cheap talk across all households that are valuing either a hypothetical or 
an actual CRP.  The remaining rows report the results of the two cheap-talk scripts interacted 
with certain demographic groups.  Consistent with the unconditional cheap-talk results in the 
previous section, all of the coefficients are either positive or not statistically different than zero.  
Overall, survey respondents are more sensitive to cheap talk when they are valuing an actual 
CRP and when cheap talk is accompanied by a reminder about substitutes and budget 
constraints.     
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
Furthermore, households with at least one member holding a Ph.D. or equivalent professional 
degree and who received short (long)-scripted cheap talk are, all else equal, willing to pay 
approximately $1.07 (1.38) more per month for an actual CRP than their counterparts who did 
                                                 
11 The estimated coefficients on these control variables are similar in sign and significance to the results in Table 1, 
and therefore are omitted.   17
not receive short (long)-scripted cheap talk.  Similarly, respondents who belong to an 
environmental organization and who received the short script are willing to pay an additional 
$1.54 per month, on average, while those who received the long script are only willing to pay an 
additional $1.45 per month.  In sum, our results indicate that cheap-talk statements may be 
ineffective or even counter-productive in mitigating hypothetical bias, with the degree of the 
problem varying across types of households. 
 
5. Conclusion 
  The evidence from our CVM survey draws into question the efficacy of cheap talk as a 
reliable and robust ex ante correction mechanism for positive hypothetical bias.  Although initial 
research has shown that a long-scripted version of cheap talk can be effective in eliminating this 
bias in lab experiments and field auctions, shorter and more neutrally worded scripts tailored for 
phone interviews have clearly demonstrated a sensitivity to script length and content.  Indeed, we 
first establish the existence of positive hypothetical bias by contrasting revealed and stated 
preference information, but then find that our neutral cheap-talk scripts actually exacerbate the 
problem.  Moreover, the degree of exacerbation seems to increase with script length and with 
respect to household characteristics (e.g., education, environmental advocacy, etc.) that are likely 
to be systematically related to the degree of observed hypothetical bias. 
  A potential criticism of our cheap-talk design is that we did not a priori establish a baseline 
degree of hypothetical bias in our data.  Had we known the extent of positive hypothetical bias in 
our data beforehand, we could have chosen a script informing respondents of the direction and 
(possibly the magnitude) of the bias, rather than using a neutral script.  CT, List, and Aadland 
and Caplan (2003) report some success with these types of directed scripts.  However, the   18
primary attraction of cheap talk as an ex ante control for hypothetical bias is its apparent 
generalizability – in the form of a standard script – to CVM studies across a wide array of non-
market goods and services.  Our findings suggest that standardized cheap-talk scripts can 
produce undesirable results.  As a result, we feel caution is warranted in using cheap talk to 
correct for hypothetical bias until we better understand how the length and content of cheap talk 
statements influence the cognitive processes of survey respondents.   19
Appendix 
Explanatory Variables  Description 
Ethical Duty  Do you feel an ethical duty to recycle to help the environment?  
1 = yes, 0 = no. 
Monetary 
Are you motivated to recycle in order to save money?  For example, are 
you able to use a smaller garbage container because you recycle or you 
get money for your aluminum cans?  1 = yes, 0 = no. 
Primarily Ethics 
Which one would most encourage your household to recycle: an ethical 
duty to help the environment, or saving money?   
1 = ethical duty, 0 = save money. 
Dropoff Distance  Distance in miles to the nearest dropoff site. 
Dropoff User 
In the past 12 months has your household taken any recyclable 
materials to one of your community’s drop-off recycling centers?  
1 = yes, 0 = no.  
Young  1 if 18<Age<35, 0 otherwise. 
Old  1 if 65<Age, 0 otherwise. 
Male  1 = male, 0 = female. 
High School  What is the highest level of education attained by any member of your 
household?  1 = high school graduate, 0 = otherwise 
Associates  1 = associates degree, 0 = otherwise 
Bachelors  1 = bachelors degree, 0 = otherwise 
Masters  1 = masters degree, 0 = otherwise 
Ph.D.  1 = Ph.D. or equivalent professional degree, 0 = otherwise 
Household Size  Number of adults currently living in the household who are older than 
18 years of age, other than the respondent. 
Environmental  
Organization  
Does anyone in your household belong to an environmental club, 
group, or organization?  1 = yes, 0 = no. 
Med Income  1 if $35K/yr<Household Income<$75K/yr, 0 otherwise 
High Income  1 if $75K/yr<Household Income, 0 otherwise 
Employed  Is the adult with the highest income currently working for pay, either 
full time or part time?  1 = yes, 0 = no. 
Retired  Is the adult with the highest income currently retired?  1 = yes, 0 = no. 
Short Cheap Talk  1 = received short cheap-talk statement, 0 otherwise. 
Longer Cheap Talk  1 = received longer cheap-talk statement, 0 otherwise. 
Sorting Required  1 = CRP requires some sorting of recyclable materials, 0 otherwise. 
Polite  1 if polite refusal for first call attempt, 0 otherwise. 
Angry  1 if angry refusal for first call attempt, 0 otherwise. 
Certainty  On a scale from 1 to 100, how certain are you to the last WTP question?
Landfill Visit  Has anyone in your household ever visited your community’s landfill?    
1 = yes, 0 = no. 
Landfill Distance  Distance to nearest landfill in miles. 
Landfill Distance > 2 mi. Distance to nearest landfill in miles if greater than 2 miles, 0 otherwise. 
Hypothetical   1 = respondent valued a hypothetical CRP, 0 = otherwise.   20
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Table 1. Random-Threshold Probit Model For CRP Participation (N = 1782) 
Estimates 
Explanatory Variables 
Coefficient P  –Value 
Ethical Duty  5.380***  0.000 
Monetary -3.051***  0.000 
Primarily Ethics  1.848***  0.005 
Dropoff Distance  0.106  0.145 
Dropoff User  -0.785  0.112 
Young 1.136** 0.018 
Old -1.769**  0.029 
Male -0.249  0.281 
High School  1.401  0.160 
Some College  1.259  0.182 
Associates 1.944*  0.096 
Bachelors 2.383**  0.047 
Masters 2.927** 0.028 
Ph.D. 2.824**  0.040 
Household Size  0.066  0.387 
Environmental Organization   2.125***  0.007 
Med Income  -0.077  0.450 
High Income  0.226  0.368 
Employed 1.147 0.111 
Retired 1.872*  0.058 
Short Cheap Talk  0.828  0.144 
Longer Cheap Talk  2.336***  0.006 
Sorting Required  -1.886***  0.003 
Polite -1.661***  0.008 
Angry 1.683  0.252 
Landfill Visit  0.315  0.265 
Landfill Distance  -10.098*  0.084 
Landfill Distance > 2 mi.  9.923*  0.087 
Certainty -0.002  0.412 
Hypothetical   3.385***  0.000 
Heteroscedasticity Variables  Coefficient  P –Value 
Constant 3.392***  0.000 
Bid 0.101  0.162 
Notes.  (***), (**), and (*) refer to statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels 
respectively.   The dependent variable is participation in a CRP.  The estimates for the 
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Table 2. Unconditional Participation Rates Across Cheap-Talk Scripts (N = 4268) 
 
  Hypothetical CRP  Actual CRP 










C-Talk  N 
≤ 2  58.3 63.0 63.0 109 61.9  75.7**  82.3***  195 
(2, 3]  64.0 64.9  77.5**  243 65.9  71.2  65.8  306 
(3, 4]  49.3 72.6***  77.9*** 234 56.9  66.0  70.6** 298 
(4, 5]  61.8 55.7 65.4 233 39.8  59.6*** 60.3***  328 
(5, 6]  60.0 52.2 62.4 222 44.9  51.6  55.6*  319 
(6, 7]  54.1 44.9 54.8 192 33.0  39.8  43.4*  272 
(7, 8]  39.1 38.2 36.8 213 24.4  32.4 41.7**  221 
(8, 9]  44.4 47.6 41.7 168 33.3  28.6  35.6  196 






> 10  30.8 43.2 41.9 132 19.2 37.1* 30.0 91 
Totals  51.0 51.4  56.4**  1910 40.3  49.5*** 52.7***  2358 
Notes:  *, ** and *** indicate significantly different than No C-Talk at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance 
levels respectively.  Estimated variances for the differences in proportions are calculated as described in 
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Table 3. Conditional Estimates of Cheap-Talk Scripts on Maximum WTP (N = 4253) 
Cheap-Talk Coefficients 
Hypothetical CRP  Actual CRP  Interactive 
Terms 
Short C-Talk  Long C-Talk  Short C-Talk  Long C-Talk 









































































Notes:  *, ** and *** indicate significantly different than No C-Talk at the 10, 5 and 1 percent significance 
levels respectively.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  CRP ≡ Curbside Recycling Program.  WTP ≡ 
Willingness To Pay.  C-Talk ≡ Cheap Talk. 
 